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INTRODUCTION
That corporate behavior may be more shaped and determined by
social norms than by legal rules seems to be an idea whose time has
come.' Respected academics have placed the relative efficacy of social
norms as compared with legal rules at the center of the debate over
the judicial role in corporate law, and some have suggested that there
are areas of internal corporate behavior and decisionmaking that
courts should monitor less rigorously because social norms adequately
govern behavior.'
Although the relevance of norms cannot be denied, the problem
with this debate is that it has an ineffable and subjective character. Of
course, individuals internalize norms, seek to maximize their
reputational capital, and function in teams that operate based on
informal systems of consensus and cooperation. They do so within
both corporations and all other forms of social organization. But
once this is said, can any testable propositions be framed? In
particular, can a corporation's perceived compliance with norms that
are not legally enforced be shown to affect the market value of its
securities?
t Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School
See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1717 (2001) (arguing that firm-specific fairness norms
promote efficiency, especially when supported by reputation effects); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (discussing
the role of social norms in several key areas of corporate law, including fiduciary
duties, corporate governance, and takeovers); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power. Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 1619 (2001) (arguing that corporate law is a sophisticated mechanism for
facilitating self-governance by nonlegally enforceable rules and standards); Donald
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended
Conse'quences of Independence and Accountability (Sept. 8, 2000),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=221773&cftoken=19218905&abstract._id
=241402.
2 Ser. e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 1. But see Paul Mahoney & Chris Sanchirico,
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2027, 2045-46 (2001) (arguing that the corporate norm that evolves within the
organization may not necessarily be efficient).
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This brief Article will answer both that compliance with nonlegally
enforceable social norms can significantly affect market value and that
innovative legal engineering designed to develop credible signals of
such compliance may be one of the most important services that
corporate attorneys can perform for their clients. In particular,
existing research has shown that (1) it is feasible to measure the
private benefits of control that those holding voting control over the
corporation are likely to extract from minority shareholders, and (2) a
credible signal that a controlling shareholder will cease or reduce the
expropriation of such private benefits appears to produce a significant
increase in the corporation's stock price. The unresolved question is
what constitutes a credible signal.
This Article starts with the recognition that the average private
benefits of control vary significantly across countries. But why? The
simplest explanation ascribes this variation to differences in law
between jurisdictions: for example, the law of jurisdiction X could
privilege controlling shareholders by allowing them to extract benefits
from their corporation in the form of above-market salaries or non-
pro-rata payments in connection with self-dealing transactions. But,
this explanation cannot fit all cases. To illustrate, if the substantive
law is essentially similar between two jurisdictions while the private
benefits of control appear to be significantly different, then some
other explanation must be found. One possible alternative
explanation could involve differences in enforcement mechanisms:
one jurisdiction might have established powerful and well-incentivized
mechanisms of private enforcement, while another jurisdiction having
the same substantive law did not. Or, one jurisdiction might invest
more heavily than the other in public enforcement. Still, if these
explanations also fail (or, at least, seem implausible), then the next
most logical explanation involves social norms. That is, if two
jurisdictions having similar legal rules and enforcement systems
appear to permit controlling shareholders to extract on average very
different levels of private benefits, then we may be witnessing a
difference in prevailing norms. This Article will argue that this
pattern is not only possible, but pervasive.
Part I of this Article will offer evidence that suggests that the social
norms regarding the behavior of controlling shareholders do differ-
and differ significantly-acrossjurisdictions. Even within jurisdictions
having relatively similar legal rules, the level of compliance with these
norms appears, on average, to differ materially. Although some of
this variation no doubt can be explained in terms of differences in
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enforcement risks, it will be argued that the magnitude of these
differences cannot be explained plausibly on any such deterrence-
related basis.
Part II will turn to possible explanations for the magnitude of
these differences in the private benefits of control across jurisdictions.
It will take the uncharacteristic step (for a corporate law article) of
seeking to relate these differences to other social characteristics that
distinguish the jurisdictions being compared-in particular, to the
levels of law compliance and crime within the jurisdiction. Although
no satisfactory metric exists for measuring law compliance across
jurisdictions, some reasonable proxies do suggest a rough
correspondence: namely, societies with high crime and/or low social
cohesion are also characterized by high private benefits of control.
Part III will then turn to the potential for value creation through
credible signaling that a corporation will comply with social norms
that are not legally enforced. On the one hand, this Article will
suggest that there are incentives for a race to the top: that is,
corporations that do bond themselves to protect the interests of
minority shareholders beyond the level that is mandated legally or is
enforced in their home jurisdiction, and that credibly signal this
intent, can enhance significantly their share prices. Such creative
legal engineering can more than pay for itself because some evidence
already suggests that corporations in countries with weak legal systems
can more than double their stock price through such self-help
measures.
On the other hand, there is also a reverse side to this coin: if
controlling shareholders in "amoral" jurisdictions that are
characterized by high private benefits of control were to acquire
control of corporations incorporated in "moral" jurisdictions
characterized by low private benefits of control (but in which the
expropriation of private benefits was not legally constrained), a
movement in the reverse direction toward greater inefficiency could
begin. If controlling shareholders in "amoral" jurisdictions are not
deterred by internalized norms or by the threat of reputational loss
then they would have every logical incentive to acquire control in
order to extract greater private benefits than had the preceding
controlling shareholder in the "moral" jurisdiction. Once, such
perversely motivated takeovers would have been infeasible because of
the high national barriers to transnational takeovers. Today, however,
So' infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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in capital markets that are increasingly globalized and in which
corporate control is increasingly contestable, movements in both
directions seem both possible and plausible.
I. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL:
A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON
An important new body of research has argued that legal rules
protecting the rights of investors-and minority shareholders in
particular-are essential to the development of deep and liquid
securities markets. 4  In a provocative series of articles, Professors
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and
Robert Vishny (hereinafter "LLS&V') have documented the existence
of significant differences among countries in terms of the breadth and
liquidity of their capital markets, the ownership concentration of
publicly traded firms, the dividend policies of firms, and the access of
firms in these markets to external capital-differences that correlate
closely with the nature of each country's legal system. More to the
point, they have found that common law countries seem to
outperform civil law countries by a significant margin in terms of both
the depth and liquidity of their capital markets and the degree of
dispersion in share ownership. Why? LLS&V conclude that the
superior quality of the legal protections afforded minority
shareholders in common law jurisdictions principally explains these
differences.5
Yet, although LLS&V have unquestionably shown a statistically
significant correlation between strong capital markets and certain
specific legal protections that tend to characterize common law legal
systems, correlation does not prove causation. The confounding
4 See, e.g., RAFAEL LA, PORTA ET AL., INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORITE
VALUATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7403, 1999) (finding
evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority
shareholders); Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the
World, 55J. FIN. 1 (2000) (supporting the outcome agency model of dividends); Rafael
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54J. FIN. 471 (1999) (finding that
in a sample of twenty-seven wealthy economies' corporations, relatively few firms are
widely held); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finane, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinant%
of External Finance, 52J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (demonstrating that countries with poorer
investor protections as measured by the character of legal rules and the quality of law
enforcement have narrower capital markets).
For the most recent statement of their position, see Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance (n.d.), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmcfid
=221923&cftoken=76970454&abstractid=183908.
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problem of multicollinearity thus makes its customary appearance
here, as it often does when attempts are made to determine the true
independent variable that influences the dependent variable. 6 Of the
N arious nagging doubts surrounding their research, perhaps the most
perplexing is the possibility that the specific legal protections
identified by LLS&V are really proxies for some deeper, but hidden,
characteristic of common law legal systems.
The point here is not to reject their "law matters" thesis, which
would be highly plausible even in the absence of strong statistical
correlations between minority legal protections and ownership
dispersion. Rather, it is to suggest that the line between law and
norms may be harder to define than this body of research has yet
recognized. Specifically, investors may invest in public corporations in
common law legal regimes (and may not invest in similar corporations
in civil law legal regimes) less because they believe they have
enforceable legal rights that adequately constrain managers and
controlling shareholders than because the), believe managers and
controlling shareholders in these common law legal regimes will abide
by a series of legally nonenforceable norms. These norms (and the
related corporate governance practices that implement them) may as
a practical matter restrict unfair self-dealing and otherwise limit the
potential for expropriation of the minority shareholder's investment.
In short, investors invest because they expect to be treated "fairly" in a
common law legal system (and have been treated so in the past), and
the), refrain from making similar investments in a civil law regime (or
they make them only at severely discounted prices) because they have
the opposite expectations (and possibly the opposite experience in
the past).
Although the specific norms and governance practices that
facilitate investment could have a close association with statutory legal
protections that are more prevalent in common law legal systems,
norms and legal rules can be entirely independent of each other, even
though the), appear closely associated. For example, no statute or
legal rule in the United States or the United Kingdom requires a
Multicollinearity refers to the possibility that coxariation among independent
ariables can gixe the misleading impression that a measured independent variable has
caused a change in a dependent variable when in fact the causation is attributable to a
hidden linkage between the dependent variable and a "true" independent variable that
is coxariant itith the "false" independent xariable. See MICI-AEL 0. FINKELSTEIN &
BRtLcE LEVIN, STXTISTICS FOR LAM'IIRS 350-52 (1990) (explaining the statistical
Nignificance of the regression coefficients). Suffice it to say here that this is a common
problem in many regression studies and seldom can it be wholly corrected.
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majority of the board of directors to be independent of management,
but this is in fact the widely prevailing practice in the case of public
corporations in both countries. Such a practice also might be
statistically associated (or "co-variant") with a legal rule (such as the
legal rules governing proxies in the United States, which do facilitate
shareholder ability to elect or oust the board of directors), but this
correlation still does not imply causation. Hence, even if a norm or
governance practice is associated with certain legal rules, this
correlation can be misleading if it is assumed that the legal rules
"cause" the board to be independent. Indeed, this would be a clear
example of multicollinearity at work, creating the misimpression that
specific legal rules (here, the proxy rules) had a causal relationship
with the depth and liquidity of the U.S. capital markets.
Reality is, however, still more complex than this example would
indicate because legal rules may sometimes be embedded in a matrix
of norms and conventional practices that all interact with and
reinforce each other. Arguably, corporation statutes can specify' a
"standard of conduct" for corporate fiduciaries that is higher than the
standard that courts will actually use in imposing liability.7 A relevant
example is supplied by the "safe harbor" or "sanitizing" statutes that
most U.S. states have enacted in order to deal with the problem of
conflict of interest transactions between a corporation and its
director.8  As interpreted by most courts, these statutes give
considerable deference to the decision of independent directors to
approve a self-dealing transaction between the corporation and a
director, and they relax the standard of judicial review that would
prevail otherwise.9 Although these statutes may recommend a high
standard of conduct, they do not require compliance in order for the
defendant to avoid liability. Indeed, they do not require an
independent board, and they even permit directors who have not
made ful disclosure to the board to validate the conflict of interest
transaction by proving its intrinsic fairness.' ° The impact of these "safe
7 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standard of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1993).
8 Examples of such "safe harbor" or "sanitizing" statutes are supplied by N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAw§ 713 (McKinney Supp. 2001) or DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
9 Cases differ on how much protection such disinterested approval by
independent directors affords. Compare Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987)
(stating that disinterested approval triggers the business judgment rule), with Fliegler
v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (stating that approval merely removes the
"cloud" caused by the director's self-interest).
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (3) (stating that a contract or
DO NORIS AMTTER?
harbor" statutes is rather to create an incentive for corporations to
adopt an independent board in order that its managers will receive
relative immunity from judicial review. To this extent, even if the
statutes mandate nothing, they reinforce the normative convention
(and probably the market's expectation) that public corporations
should have independent boards.
Legal rules and social norms thus have a way of melting into each
other without a sharp, clear line defining where the law ends and the
norms begin. Investors realize that they are protected by both, and
hence an unexplained departure from a prevailing governance
practice might elicit a market penalty. Yet, at least within the U.S.
context, attempts to identify corporate governance practices that
actually enhance shareholder value and elicit a positive market
reaction generally have been unsuccessful." Possibly, shareholders
understand that there can be justifications for departures from
generally accepted governance practices; or possibly, they recognize
that a variety of overlapping functional substitutes for any individual
corporate governance practice exists so that an isolated departure may
have little meaning.
If research within the United States on the relationship between
corporate governance practices and market valuation has not been
fruitful, it does not follow that this same pattern will persist outside
the United States or that the relationship is necessarily weak. The first
thing one learns when one looks outside the United States is that
there are enormous variations, depending on the corporation's
jurisdiction of incorporation, in the market's expectation that
minority shareholders will face expropriation. Such expropriation
most typically occurs because of the ability of a controlling
shareholder to extract what economists term the "private benefits of
control" from the corporation.'2 The term "private benefits of
control" is a shorthand expression for all of the ways in which those in
control of a corporation can siphon off benefits to themselves that are
transaction is valid without disclosure to the board if it is "fair as to the corporation as
of the time" authorized or approved); N.Y Bus. CORP. L-,w § 713(b) (placing the duty
on the director in such cases to prove the transaction was "fair and reasonable to the
corporation at the time").
r) Professor Black assesses these studies in his article in this volume. Bernard
Black, Dor Cowporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 2131, 2133-34 & nn.2-6 (2001).
k For a discussion of this standard term, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1073, 1090 (1990).
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not shared pro rata with the other shareholders, including through
(1) above-market salaries, (2) unfair self-dealing transactions with the
corporation, (3) insider trading, or (4) the issuance of shares to
themselves at dilutive prices.Y3 In all jurisdictions, corporate law
attempts to address and limit the extraction of private benefits of
control, but with varying degrees of success.
The new focus on comparative corporate governance has led
researchers to seek to measure variations in the private benefits of
control across countries. Tatiana Nenova, a Harvard economist,
directly approached this task by identifying a sample of all dual-class
firms whose securities were listed in the thirty largest national capital
markets in the world.14 Overall, she found some 661 firms. Dual-class
firms are corporations with two classes of shares having different
voting rights, and thus they permit direct observation of the value of
voting control. Essentially, once adjustments are made for any
differences in cash flow or dividend rights, the aggregate premium at
which the higher-voting class trades over the lesser-voting class is
assumed to represent the value of control." The bottom-line
conclusion from this study was that the value of corporate control
differed enormously across countries, and in certain countries-most
notably, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mexico, and South Korea-
amounted to "alarmingly high" levels that were between a quarter and
a half of the firm's market capitalization. 6 The extreme case was
Mexico, where controlling shareholders were found to "expropriate
one half of the value of the company, sharing the remaining half with
minority shareholders in proportion to share holdings.' 7  Yet, in
other countries, including the United States and Canada, the value of
control was much less (generally below four percent),"' thus
13 Id.
14 Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-
Country Analysis 3 (Sept. 21, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=
221634&cftoken=7463198&abstractjid=237809.
15 The basic methodology used in this study is not new and parallels that earlier
used by Luigi Zingales in a series of seminal articles. Luigi Zingales, The Value of the
Voting Right: A Study of theMilan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125 (1994);
Luig 6 Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes ?, 110 Q.J. ECON. 1047 (1995).
17 Nenova, supra note 14, at 4.
Id. The use of the word "expropriate" here is conclusory and possibly
unjustified because one does not know what the minority shareholders paid for their
shares. If minority shareholders assumed that one-half of the firm's cash flow would be
diverted to controlling shareholders, they presumably paid correspondingly less for
their shares.
is Id.
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apparently indicating that the private benefits of control diverted to
controlling shareholders in these countries were considerably less.
Perhaps more importantly, not only did the private benefits of
control differ dramatically across countries, but the average private
benefits of control differed systematically in terms of the "legal
families" to which individual countries belonged. Table 1 sets forth
these differences: '
Table 1
Average Private Benefits of
Control as a Percentage of a
Legal Family Firm's Market Capitalization
Scandinavian Civil Law Countries 0.5%
Common Law Countries 4.5%
German Civil Law Countries 16.2%
French Civil Law Countries 25.4%
At first glance, this data certainly seems to support the "law
matters" hypothesis.:"" One can read the data as demonstrating that
the tougher the legal environment, the less the private benefits that
the control holder can extract. Indeed, Professor Nenova concluded
that: "More than 70% of systematic differences in vote value are
explained by the quality of investor protection that non-controlling
shareholders enjoy as per the country laws, their rights in the case of
control transfer, and the extent of law enforcement.'
'!
But is it this simple? Clearly, forces of social control seem more at
P, Id. The sample contained a substantial number of observations of firms for
each legal family: Scandinavian civil law countries (109), common law countries (161),
French civil law countries (224), and German civil law countries (167). Id. at 30-31.
The "law matters" hypothesis essentially posits that economic development,
particularly in transitional economies, depends upon the protection and enforcement
of minority shareholder rights. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prmp, rts fr Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Inplications, 93 NW. U. L.
REv. 641, 643-48 (1999). Obviously, the strongest proponents of this thesis have been
LLS&V. See supra note 4. Their claim that the common law outperforms the civil law
in protecting minority shareholder rights is actually a subset, or a more specialized
application of the broader "law matters" hypothesis.
A Nenova, supra note 14, at 4.
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work in some jurisdictions than others, and controlling shareholders
in French civil law countries appear to feel substantially less inhibited
than controlling shareholders elsewhere about extracting private
benefits of control. But are those controlling shareholders less
constrained because they are less deterred or because they can
rationalize their behavior under social norms that view the controlling
shareholder as more entitled to extract such benefits? In short, the
data raises, but does not resolve, the critical issue of the relative role of
law versus other forces of social control.
One way to approach this question is to ask whether significant
differences in the average level of private benefits of control extracted
by controlling shareholders can be explained plausibly by differences
in the prevailing substantive law. That is, if the substantive law were
highly similar but the average private benefits differed dramatically, it
would become more difficult to explain these differences in terms of
the relative efficacy of the substantive law. To the extent that prior
research has generally focused on common law versus civil law
countries, these studies plausibly have sought to attribute differences
in outcome to the seemingly major differences between the common
law and the civil law. But the foregoing data set is not so easily
explained, and actually tends to subvert this explanation. As Table 1
above showed, Scandinavian legal systems seem to outperform both
common law and French and German civil law legal systems in terms
of reducing the private benefits of control. If common law legal
systems are thus straddled on both sides by different forms of civil law
systems, it becomes more difficult to rely on any explanation that
assumes the natural superiority of the common law's technology for
shareholder protection over that of the civil law.
In addition, significant variations are evident even within the same
legal family. Table 2 breaks out some of the differences within family
22
groups:
22 Id. at 51 tbl.5 (measuring "[c]omparison of mean total vote value as a share of
firm value, raw averages").
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Table 2
Total Vote Value as a Share
Country of Firm Value
Scandinavian Countries
Denmark 0.008
Finland -0.05
Norway 0.058
Sweden 0.01
Common Law Countries
Australia 0.23
Canada 0.03
Hong Kong -0.029
South Africa 0.07
United Kingdom 0.096
United States 0.02
German Civil Law Countries
Germany 0.095
South Korea 0.29
Switzerland 0.05
French Civil Law Countries
Brazil 0.23
Chile 0.23
France 0.28
Italy 0.29
Mexico 0.36
Within common law countries, Australia stands out as an outlier.
Although the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, each
sharing much legal tradition and cultural heritage with Australia, all
have low and closely similar percentages for total vote value as a
percentage of firm value, Australia's percentage is over ten times
higher than that of the United states and roughly two and one-half
times the next highest common law country on this table. 2: Germany
also requires special attention for the opposite reason. Although
researchers have regularly criticized German civil law for its lack of
minority protections, the German and British figures for total vote
value as a percentage of firm value are almost identical: 0.095 and
0.096, respectively. " Yet, in the case of South Korea, which derived its
-* It is possible that this could be a consequence of the limited number of
obsernations (three) in this study of Australian firms. Id.
2 Here, there were numerous observations: sixty-five in the case of Germany and
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law from Germany but obviously not its cultural heritage or social
norms, the corresponding percentage is 0.29-or over three times as
high.'5 The obvious inference is that "transplanted" law may not
"take," possibly because it conflicts with the host country's own norms
and customs.
26
A closer examination of the foregoing table also suggests that the
assumed superiority of common law to civil law represents a gross
oversimplification. If one looks at the German and Swiss figures (and
drops South Korea from the class of German countries as an example
of the "transplant effect 2 7), then the value of control appears
relatively similar in the case of both German and common law
countries-despite significant differences in their legal regimes. In
addition, Scandinavian countries do significantly better on average
than common law countries in restricting the private benefits of
control-again despite the presumed inferiority of the civil law
tradition.
The real surprise that emerges from this table is the inferior
performance of the French civil law countries. Uniformly, they
exhibit very high values associated with voting control. Only South
Korea and Australia rival their levels. Of course, it is this substandard
performance of French civil law that fuels the LLS&V hypothesis that
the common law better protects minority shareholder rights than the
civil law. But there is another possible interpretation. The French
civil law countries in the foregoing table are culturally heterogeneous
(Brazil and Chile do not derive their cultural standards or norms from
France), whereas the common law countries in the foregoing table
share greater cultural affinity and all at least historically experienced
twenty-seven in the case of the United Kingdom Id.
There were sixty-five observations of South Korea firms and of German firms, so
this comparison cannot be the result of one or two idiosyncratic firms. Id.
26 One recent study does find that the way law is initially transplanted and received
is a more important determinant of its legal effectiveness than the source of the law in
terms of the legal family (for example, English, French, or Scandinavian) to which it
belongs. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, LegalitY and the Transplant
Effect (Nov. 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?cfid=221385&cftoken=
99302065&abstract.id=183269. Studying the acceptance of new legal principles in
forty-nine countries, they find that "transplanted law" succeeds when it is consistent
with local customs or had a population that was already familiar with its basic legal
principles. They estimate that, when these circumstances are not present,
"transplanted law" will be, on average, one-third less effective. Id. Restated in this
Article's terminology, this is essentially a finding that legal rules work best when they
reinforce and are supported by the prevailing norms of the society.
27 See id. (describing cultural incongruence as a principal reason why transplanted
legal rules are not effective).
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British colonization and administration. This difference implies that
the "transplant effect" could be surreptitiously at work here and could
explain much of the disparity. That is, the attempted transplant of
French civil law might not have taken because of its lack of
congruence with local norms and customs, whereas the common law
transplant did take because it was accompanied by British colonists
who respected and accepted it.
This latter interpretation does not reject the "law matters"
hypothesis that effective legal rules are essential to economic
development. Rather, its more modest claim would be that in the
wake of the failure of "transplanted" law, controlling shareholders
were left with few constraints on their behavior and, by default, a de
facto "take-the-money-and-run" ethic prevails. Put differently,
although the applicable norms in South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil
could differ significantly in their normative content, they may share
the common characteristic of imposing little constraint on controlling
persons.-" If so, however varied and nuanced these normative systems
may be, they can be described as "weak" in an operational sense.
To sum up, a surrey of all listed firms in some thirty countries
shows that, in terms of limiting the private benefits of control,
Scandinavian firms outperform common law country firms, which in
turn outperform firms in German civil law countries-but all of these
basically marginal differences pale in comparison to the virtual right
to plunder that controlling shareholders seem to have in firms in
French civil law countries.
What interpretation best explains these results? LLS&V's now
standard explanation that the common law better protects minority
shareholders cannot easily explain the Scandinavian superiority or the
near equivalence between common law firms and German civil law
firms. But the contrary hypothesis that "law does not matter" similarly
fails to explain either the fact that deep and liquid securities markets
are found only in common law countries"' or the dramatic failure of
French civil law in constraining the private benefits of control.
To be able to account for these results, an), theory that assigns
primary causal responsibility to law would have to explain why the civil
-" This explanation still does not adequately account for high private benefits of
o ntrol in France and Italy, which cannot be described as jurisdictions to which French
ctil law has been "transplanted." Hence, these examples do support the LLS&V
hN pothesis.
- For the fullest statement of this finding, see La Porta et al., Law and Finance,
Wjpa note 4.
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law could outperform the common law in some countries but then
underperform it in others. Such an explanation would logically have
to respond either that (1) the civil law in Scandinavian countries was
substantively very different from that in French or German countries
(with French civil law being conspicuously more deficient), or (2)
there were significant differences in the enforcement of legal rules
that distinguished these three legal families. Neither explanation
seems remotely plausible. First, Scandinavian civil law does not treat
the corporation notably differently than do the civil laws of France or
Germany. According to LLS&V, who have constructed an
"antidirector rights index" to measure the strength of the legal
protections accorded shareholders, Scandinavian civil law ranks
behind the common law and just equal to the world average.
Scandinavian law also affords no special legal protections to
"oppressed minority" shareholders." The one respect in which
Scandinavia does seem to outscore its rivals is in ratings for the
"Efficiency of the Judicial System" and freedom from "Corruption.-2
Yet, high ratings for lack of corruption arguably evidence more the
strength of norms within the country than the substantive superiority
of its doctrinal law.
Second, in terms of enforcement capacity, the legal systems of
Europe (both common law and civil law) differ markedly from that of
the United States. Only the United States has the class action and the
contingent fee, and these have been combined in the United States to
assure generous compensation to the successful plaintiff s attorney in
a class action.3  Finally, unlike the United Kingdom, the United
States normally makes each side bear its own legal expenses, with the
result that plaintiffs are spared the prospect of fee shifting against
them of the typically greater legal expenses incurred by corporate
defendants. Together, these three elements-the class action, the
30 See La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 38 tbl.1. Scandinavia's "antidirector rights
index" rating of 3 is behind the 4 rating given to common law countries and equal to
the 3 rating specified as the "World Average," but ahead of the 2.33 rating given to
both French civil law and German civil law countries. Id.
31 Id. In contrast, 50% of German civil law countries and 94% of common law
countries have such a remedy. Id.
32 Even on these scores, German civil law countries were not far behind, although
French civil law countries lagged badly. Id.
3. Canada and a few other countries have begun to experiment with the class
action, but do not reward class counsel with a contingent fee in the form of a
presumptive percentage of the recovery. Hence, few class actions have yet been
brought in these jurisdictions.
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contingent fee, and the American rule on fee shifting-have created
in the United States (but basically nowhere else to any equivalent
degree) an entrepreneurial system of private law enforcement.14 As a
result, for a European legal system to compare favorably with the
United States in terms of enforcement, it would have to compensate
for weak private enforcement with very strong public enforcement of
corporate legal rules. Again, this seems unlikely, because the SEC is
generally recognized as the world's premier public enforcer in the
area of corporate and securities law, and it has served as the template
which several European countries have explicitly sought to emulate.
Not only do the Scandinavian countries lack any comparable public
enforcer, but their largest companies typically list on foreign stock
exchanges (whether in New York, London, Paris, or Frankfurt), and
hence are more subject to the self-regulatory rules of these bodies.
Where does this leave us? It suggests that if corporate law is
reasonably similar across Europe and if aggregate enforcement
efforts-both public and private-fall well below those in the United
States, one must look beyond law to social norms to explain the very
different performance of firms in Scandinavian, German, French, and
common law countries.
II. BEYOND LAW: WHAT ELSE EXPLAINS DIFFERENCES
IN CORPORATE BEHAVIOR?
To this point, we have examined only differences in substantive
law and in legal enforcement in order to explain the significant
differences in the magnitude of the private benefits of control that
controlling shareholders extract across different jurisdictions. In a
world in which all actors are assumed to be amoral and to be deterred
only by the prospect of sanctions, this might exhaust the possible
explanations. But an alternative set of explanations emerges if we
postulate that the principal actors in corporate governance may
internalize norms and act in accordance with them.
But is this proposition testable? Easy as it is to postulate norm
internalization, it is more problematic to measure it or to relate it to
cross-country differences in observed outcomes. Some approximate
measures do, however, suggest themselves. For example, one can
postulate that a strong norm of law compliance exists in some
countries, but is less present or even absent in others. A rough proxy
31 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficenc , in te Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1987).
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for this norm might be the national crime rate. In this light, it is
noteworthy that Scandinavian countries have long had crime rates
well below that of most industrialized nations.f A correspondence
might then be hypothesized between a low crime rate and low
expropriation of private benefits of control. If we look only to the
Scandinavian countries, this generalization seems to work. Although
there are few comparative studies of crime rates, a 1990 study under
the auspices of the World Health Organization ranked twenty leading
industrial countries based on victim survey data. 6 Three Scandinavian
countries were included: Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Norway
ranked next to last (or 19th) with the second lowest rate of
victimization and Finland and Sweden were ranked below average at
11 th and 13th, respectively, in terms of victimization rates."
But if the premise that Scandinavians are more law-abiding than
citizens of most other countries looks persuasive, it fails to provide an
adequate explanation for corporate opportunism, because many
countries with poor records on corporate governance did equally well
in terms of crime rates. For example, the two German law countries
in this same sample-Germany and Switzerland-ranked 15th and
17th, respectively 8 Even France, the alleged symbol of shameless
opportunism in corporate law matters, ranked 14th, better than either
Sweden or Finland. What countries had the highest levels of crime
victimization? The United States came 1st, New Zealand 2nd,
Australia 3rd, and Canada 4th." Obviously, the common law
countries do not do well on this scorecard, even though they perform
excellently in terms of policing the private benefits of control. Yet,
the relationship between crime rates and corporate opportunism is
not generally inverse, as the Scandinavian success testifies.
Of course, one explanation for this seeming paradox may be that
serious crime (at least, the types measured by crime victimization
studies) and corporate opportunism are different phenomena,
engaged in by different classes of persons, located typically in
35 This has consistently been true for decades. See, e.g., HENRY MILNER, SWEDEN:
SoCIAL DEMOCRACY IN PRACTcE 206 (1989) (discussing Sweden's rates of drug use,
prostitution, crime, and delinquency).
36 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 7-8 (1997) (discussing Jan van Dijk and Pat Mayhew's
1992 study of victim survey crime rate categories and homicide rates in twenty
countries).
37 Id. at 8.
Id.
39 Id. England and Wales ranked 10th out of 20. Id.
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different positions within society. Violent crime is, let us assume,
engaged in most commonly by the social underclass, while controlling
shareholders who expropriate wealth from minority shareholders
belong, by definition, to a more socially privileged class. In
Scandinavia, however, both groups seem to obey the law more than
elsewhere. "
Scandinavia's unique position actually suggests a revised
hypothesis. Perhaps what is most distinctive about Scandinavia is its
level of social cohesion and homogeneity. In contrast, the United
States is characterized by much greater diversity, both ethnic and
religious, and possibly by a greater degree of polarization between
social groups. Arguably, social cohesion produces greater conformity
with social norms. Not only can this revised hypothesis explain low
exploitation of minority shareholders in Scandinavia, but it may also
explain the high expropriation rates in many French civil law
countries. Table 2 above showed that Mexico was characterized by the
highest expected level of expropriation, because it had the highest
value accorded to voting control (36%); Brazil and Chile were not far
behind at 23% each. Although nominally French civil law countries,
in reality each are Hispanic nations with sharp class and racial
divisions, significant political tensions, and (in the case of Brazil and
Chile) a recent history of military governments. None of this
enhances social cohesion. Indeed, Brazil and Mexico are two of the
very few countries that have a higher homicide rate than the United
States." Similarly, Russia is characterized by both a very high
homicide rate and a unique level of expropriation of minority
1' One is thus led to consider more speculative theories. Perhaps Scandinavians
have seen too many Ingmar Bergman movies and are too guilt-ridden as a result to
engage in any form of misconduct. Alternatively, there is the "blondes have more fun"
theory under which Scandinavians ignore money to pursue goals that Freud
understood.
H Although the United States is often loosely asserted to have the highest
homicide rate in the world, the evidence is othenrise. According to the Statistical
Abstract of the United States, the U.S. homicide rate in 1997 was 7.0 per 100,000 citizens
(a level well above all European countries other than Russia), which was a decline from
the 7.9 level in 1996. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABST,AC OFTHE UNITED STATES 217 (119th ed. 1999). Brazil, in contrast, has a rising
homicide rate that reached 25 per 100,000 in 1996 (more than three times the U.S.
rate in that year). Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Democratic Governance, iolence and the
(Un)Rule of Law, 129 DAEDALUS 119, 122-23 (2000). In 1992, the Mexican homicide
rate was estimated at 16.8 per 100,000 citizens. RichardJ. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the
Answer. Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1029, 1036 n.16 (1998).
2001] 2167
2168 UNIERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:2151
shareholders.4 2
Social cohesion must also be viewed through the prism of history.
The recent history of a jurisdiction may demonstrate that its social
fabric has been disrupted in a manner that could affect its corporate
governance. For example, corporate governance in Russia may be
weak not only because of problems within its corporate and judicial
systems, but because the prior system of social organization (that is,
the communist bureaucratic state) collapsed, and political instability
has largely reigned in its wake. Simple as this point sounds, it applies
well beyond the Russian context or even that of other transitional
economies with evident internal political tensions (for example,
Mexico, Brazil, or Chile). To illustrate, the United States was once
clearly subject to very high private benefits of control during the late
ninteenth century. This was the era of the robber barons, and stock
was regularly watered, the securities market manipulated, and
corporate control exploited to promote the personal interests of the
controlling shareholder. 3 Not coincidentally, this was also the era
immediately following the Civil War, when long simmering internal
tensions had erupted and caused a total breakdown of the former
constitutional system. Moreover, the post-Civil War era in the United
States was also a time of rapid and dislocating social and economic
change, as a new class of industrialists (such as Rockefeller, Carnegie,
and Vanderbilt) arose to replace the business leaders of the prior era
who had been drawn primarily from merchant and professional
groups. The business tactics of this era also changed as the new
industrialists (most notably, Rockefeller) sought monopoly status and
forced their competitors into submission. In such a predatory
environment and at a time well before the emergence of a
professional managerial class at the turn of the twentieth century,"
42 In 1993, the Russian homicide rate was estimated at 19.5 per 100,000 citizens,
which is midway between the homicide rates of Brazil and Mexico, and two and one-
half times the current U.S. rate. Cottrol, supra note 41, at 1036 n.16.
43 For a concise history of corporate law and governance during the era, see
LAwRENcE FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 511-25 (2d ed. 1985). I have
elsewhere analyzed at length the measures taken by both investment bankers and
regulators to curb the opportunistic behavior of the robber barons during the late
nineteenth century. SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: l1hat Causes
the Separation of Ownership and Control?, 111 YALE LJ. 1 (2001).
44 Alfred Chandler has devoted much of his career as a business historian to
tracing the rise of a professional managerial class in the United States, which transition
he essentially dates to the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
centuries. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIL,
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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there were few unifing or socializing forces that generated normative
constraints on the business managers of that era. In this light, the
corporate governance landscape of Russia in the late 1990s looked
much like that of the United States during the 1870s.
The point here is that normative consensus emerges most clearly
in a business society characterized by social cohesion. Elsewhere in
this Symposium, Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair argue that
behavior within firms is governed by internalized norms and that the
primary motor forces within the corporation are the "behavioral
phenomena of internalized trust and trustworthiness."4 5 True as this
may be, trust and trustworthiness are learned behaviors, to which the
corporate actor is socialized in the broader society. The more that
society as a whole is turbulent, chaotic, and divided and the more that
it rewards predatory or opportunistic behavior, the more that such
experiences may influence behavior within the corporation as well.
To sum up, to the extent that a capacity for trust is the critical
organizational glue (as they argue), its ability to restrain behavior and
limit the private benefits of control may depend upon the level of
social cohesion within the broader society.
This social cohesion thesis, however, does not answer all
questions. For example, both France and Italy have moderate overall
crime rates, but have high rates of expropriation of the private
benefits of control that rival those of Brazil and Chile. While perhaps
not as cohesive or homogeneous as Scandinavia, neither France nor
Italy approaches Brazil or Mexico in terms of internal tensions, class
divisions, or ethnic conflict. Despite this fact, their controlling
shareholders appear to behave much like those in these more
conflicted societies.
Thus, a final possibility that could explain high private benefits of
control may be some characteristic of the average corporation in a
cixil law country that justifies (or, at least, can be used to rationalize)
the belief of its controlling shareholders that they are entitled to
extract greater private benefits. To illustrate this hypothesis, let us
contrast the prototypical experience of two start-up companies, one in
the United States and the other in a civil law jurisdiction. In the
United States, the young entrepreneurs of a high-tech start-up
company secure venture capital backing, and within four to five years
effect a successful initial public offering ("IPO") in which the
I- Margaret N1. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2001).
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company goes public at a price-earning ratio of fifty to one. Public
stockholders buy over 70% of the equity in this company, leaving
management marginally in control with a 30% block (typically, the
venture capitalists who initially financed the company cash in their
chips and move on within a year of the offering). The founders'
shares here do not carry a sizable control premium because control
has in effect been sold to the public market (where a determined
corporate bidder might well be able to acquire it in a hostile tender
offer).
Next, let us focus on more standard European history. A
company is founded, without the assistance of venture capital
financing, which is less available in Europe, in part because venture
capitalists cannot anticipate an early IPO in the wake of which they
will be able to liquidate their investment. In fact, the company never
effects an IPO in the United States/United Kingdom sense of that
term, but over time (say, ten to twenty years) its stock becomes
dispersed into the hands of customers, suppliers, and descendants of
the founders, and trading begins in an illiquid market. Because its
founders still hold an easily controlling block of stock in their
company (say, 75%), the publicly traded shares trade at a large
discount that reflects that control premium held by the founders (and
their ability to extract private benefits). Hence, some public
shareholders, who are unaffiliated with the founders, may acquire
blocks in the secondary market equal to 1% to 3% of the outstanding
stock at highly discounted prices that are well below the company's
liquidation value per share.
Will the managements of these two prototypical companies regard
their public shareholders in the same light? Arguably, they will not.
The American management sees a shareholder class that paid a high
premium in the expectation that management owes them a fiduciary
duty that demands exacting loyalty. In contrast, the European
founders and managers may regard their public shareholders as
opportunists, who bought at discounted prices that reflected the
founders' right to control and to extract private benefits. Indeed, the
European founders could even view their failure to extract their
traditional level of private benefits from their company as, in effect,
bestowing a windfall on the public shareholders who bought at
discounted prices that assumed those private benefits would continue
to be extracted.
To present this justification is not to accept it. There are social
costs and allocative inefficiencies to a capital market system that
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systematically underprices the stock of such firms in concentrated
ownrership systems. Rather, the point of this illustration is, first, that
norms are central, and, second, that they may be context specific.
Arguably, the American entrepreneurs might have the same sense of
entitlement to extract private benefits if the, saw their minority
shareholders buying their stock at heavily discounted prices. Hence,
the operative norms may vary less because of national normative
differences than because of differences in the characteristic
development of firms, with "weak" European securities markets in
effect producing correspondingly "weaker" social norms about the
obligations of controlling shareholders. In turn, based on these
"weaker" norms, "weaker" duties might be codified in civil law systems
than in common law systems. There is a potential irony here. While
LLS&V argue that strong markets presuppose strong laws protecting
minority shareholders, one can at least imagine the reverse dynamic:
strong markets come first and create a demand for stronger laws to
protect the constituency of investors who have entered those
markets."'
III. NormS AND THE MARKET
Norms are often defined as informal rules of conduct that
constrain self-interested behavior but are not enforced by any
authoritative body that can imtpose a sanction. The absence of an
enforcer does not mean, however, that there is no sanction.
Reputational loss to a firm, when it violates a norm (and is detected in
so doing), can be severe." What happens, however, when norm
violation is endemic, in effect when "everyone is doing it?" In such a
world, where the norm is more honored in the breach than in the
observance, the market cannot logically expect that any firm will
comply with the norm, and it should discount all firms by the value
that the expected noncompliance subtracts from what otherwise
T' I have made the argument at length elsewhere, tracing the histories of the New
Y k Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, the Paris Bourse, and the various
German stock exchanges. See Coffee, supra note 43.
7 This definition roughly parallels that used by Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note
2, at 2030 ("Norms... are rules of conduct that constrain self-interested behavior and
that are adopted and enforced in an informal, decentralized setting.").
N, Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Finns Bear
imn Conntitting Cieminal Fraud, 36J.L. & ECON. 757, 784 (1993) ("[T]he loss incurred
by a firm accused or found guilt , of fraud is its lost reputation."). "[T]he reduction in
t( ck market xalue could be due to the reputational loss suffered by the firm." Id.
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would be the firm's market capitalization. Even in such a world in
which the norm is arguably more nominal than real, however, those
firms that can credibly signal their intent to comply with the norm
may be able to enhance their market value.
Professor Bernard Black's article in this Symposium provides
striking evidence that the market does respond to credible signals that
a firm will comply with norms that protect minority shareholders-at
least when such a signal differentiates the firm from the majority of
firms that are not so complying.49 Essentially, he finds a strong and
statistically significant correlation between the corporate governance
ranking that a group of Russian firms received from one Russian
investment bank and the ratio of their actual market capitalization to
their potential market capitalization in a Western market, as
independently estimated by another Russian investment banking
firm.' That is, some firms in his Russian sample traded at prices well
under 1% of their potential Western market capitalization, while
others traded at levels as high as nearly 50% of their estimated
potential Western market capitalization.' The critical difference
between these firms appeared to be the quality of their corporate
governance practices: firms with good governance rankings traded as
high as 48% of their estimated Western market capitalization, while
firms with low rankings traded at under 1%.
As Professor Black notes, similar research on corporate
governance practices in the United States or other Western nations
has not yielded similarly dramatic results.5' Thus, the key factor
underlying the strength of the correlation between governance
practices and market value in his study may be the weakness of the
underlying Russian law and the entire Russian legal system. If legal
rules are too weak or underenforced to provide protection, alternative
sources of protection become correspondingly more important.
For precisely this reason, it is necessary to examine more closely
49 See Black, supra note 11, at 2148 ("In Russia, firm-level variation in governance
behavior appears to have a huge effect on market value. It is the dominant source of
interfirm variation in the value ratio of actual market capitalization to potential
Western market capitalization.").
50 Id. at 2140 tbl.2.
51 Only one firm, Vimpelcom, traded at this approximate level (actually 48%), and
it was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. The next highest firms traded at
18% and 16% of their estimated potential Western capitalization, while the lowest
ranking traded at 0.01% and 0.02%. Id.
52 Id. 2148 ("In developed countries, firm-level variation in corporate governance
practices has a minor effect on market value.").
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the factors that comprised the corporate governance rankings in his
study. Basically, they fall into two general categories: (1) reputational
factors, and (2) bonding efforts that give rise to enforceable rights. 5
For example, a Russian company's past reputation and the attitude of
its management toward shareholders may signal a sincere intent to
comply ith social norms that generally prevail in the West, but they
confer no enforceable rights. Conversely, a preemptive rights charter
provision, a low ceiling on authorized shares, or the deliberate
creation of a blocking position that permits minority shareholders to
veto proposed charter amendments do create enforceable rights.
They are efforts at bonding because they tie management's hands-at
least to the extent that Russian courts will enforce the corporate
contract as it was written. Such contractual rights (even if they only
establish procedures) are quite different from nonlegally enforceable
norms (or "NLERS"). Thus, while Professor Black's data tends to
confirm that "corporate governance matters," it is far more equivocal
evidence as to whether "norms matter." That is, to the extent we
define norms as conventions and practices that may be expected but
are not legally enforceable, some of the factors in the corporate
governance rankings that he uses do give rise to enforceable
protections (while others are only reputational in character). Hence,
it is indeterminate whether his data show the market responding to
unenforceable signals of an intent to comply with Western norms of
corporate governance or to more objective and enforceable measures
that effectively create contractual rights.
This same ambiguity also underlies earlier studies. I have
previously suggested that the cross-listing by non-U.S. firms on the
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") also represents a form of
" Professor Black's research uses some eight elements to determine "corporate
governance risk." Id. at 2138 tbl.1. Some of these factors on Table 1 depend upon the
company's prior reputation. For example, the first factor, "Disclosure &
Transparency," looks in part to the firm's "poor reputation for openness" and "poor
shareholder meeting notice." Id. Obviously, whatever the company's past reputation,
its behavior can change in the future. Other elements depend, however, upon
enforceable rights. For example, the second factor, "Dilution Through Share
Issuance," looks to such factors as "No portfolio investor blocking stake" and "No
piemptive rights in charter." Id. These are objective factors that involve the company
deliberately restricting its management's discretion in order to assure investors that
they %%ill not be exploited. Such self-imposed restrictions are examples of "bonding."
.,,Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theoy of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Ag,.o3 Cu1. and Owneship Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Because the majority
Of the elements on the rating score sheet used to determine the rankings employed in
Professor Black's study are reputational and do not involve enforceable rights, I have
some skepticism that these rankings ill have continuing or constant predictive value.
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bonding, as it assures investors of enhanced disclosure and potentially
subjects them to litigation in U.S. courts.4 While it has long been
known that such a cross-listing on the NYSE by a foreign firm elicits an
increase in its stock price, recent research has found that firms
incorporated in jurisdictions having "weak" corporate laws are more
likely to cross-list than firms incorporated in jurisdictions with "strong"
corporate laws." Subsequent to cross-listing in the United States,
foreign firms are also more likely to conduct an equity offering in
their own country, thus suggesting that a U.S. cross-listing gives
meaningful assurances to investors in the firm's home country.
But what exactly is the market responding to when the stock price
of a foreign firm that cross-lists in the United States increases? Is it
the enforcable promise of better and fuller disclosure (based on the
obligation to satisfy U.S. generally accepted accounting principles)? Is
it the potential threat of Rule 10b-5 liability if the issuer makes false
statements? Or is it simply the signal that the firm is seeking to
improve its corporate governance? Alternatively, the price increase
might not be the result of bonding at all, but could be a response to
the change in supply and demand once the firm taps into the much
larger U.S. capital market.
These ambiguities prevent bottom-line conclusions at this point.
Clearly, self-help efforts to signal intended compliance with norms
matter when the corporation takes action that truly binds the hands
or limits the discretion of those who might violate those norms. For
example, inclusion in the corporate charter of a provision establishing
preemptive rights should logically have as much real world impact as
the existence of a legal rule that mandates preemptive rights.
Whether mere precatory statements by the corporation not
accompanied by measures giving rise to enforceable rights also impact
on a firm's valuation is more open to question because the existing
research has not yet isolated the specific elements in corporate
governance policies that affect market value.
Even if precatory corporate signals to the market (that is, those
not accompanied by actions that limit the discretion of the self-
interested actor) do affect market value (as is certainly possible), it
4 Coffee, supra note 20, at 674.
5 See William A. Reese,Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings 3
(Jan. 29, 2000), http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?cfid=222015&cftoken=
31298607&abstract_id=194670 ("The desire to protect shareholder rights appears to
be one of a number of reasons why non-U.S. firms cross-list in the United States.").
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should not be assumed that the market has necessarily found its
equilibrium position. Such precatory signals are relatively costless,
and if they do affect market value, it can be assumed that many firms
will eventually send them. At this point, a Gresham's Law of promises
may take hold, as "bad" signals will proliferate and drive out the
"good." Eventually, as in the classic "lemons market," all such signals
will be discounted equivalently unless and until investors find ways to
discriminate between the "honest" signals and the "false" signals: 6
For these reasons, I am somewhat less optimistic than Professor
Black may be that corporate governance rankings, particularly to the
extent they are based on precatory or nonbinding commitments, will
continue to correlate closely with stock market valuations in
transitional markets. Still, an enormous role exists, particularly in
transitional economies, for creative legal engineering to make such
signals credible. Those who are successful create value-precisely
because the formal law is weak.
CONCLUSION
Norms do matter, but exactly when and to what extent remain
more problematic issues. The magnitude of the variations in the
private benefits of control across countries cannot be satisfactorily
explained simply in terms of differences in substantive corporate law
or associated enforcement systems. Law compliance also varies across
countries, although not in a manner that systematically parallels the
variations in the private benefits of control. Still, to varying degrees,
social forces that are independent of any legal sanction constrain
managers and controlling shareholders. What explains the striking
variations among countries remains, however, largely unexplained.
One tentative generalization, however, may be advanced: norms
may matter most when law is the weakest. When formal law does not
adequately protect shareholders, the strength of social norms
becomes more important, because they could provide a functional
substitute for law. Conversely, when legal rights and remedies
adequately protect investors, there is less need for corporations to
signal their intentions to observe standards that are already legally
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970) (noting that when buyers in a market
(including investors in the securities market) cannot distinguish "good" from "bad"
merchants, they will discount all more or less equally). To escape this dilemma, signals
must be credible-particularly once they become common.
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mandated or to develop creative means by which to bond those
promises through self-help corporate governance measures. This may
explain why corporate governance measures have seldom been found
to affect the corporation's stock price in the United States, but
apparently do have such an impact in Russia."
When law is weak and social norms about shareholders' rights are
also underdeveloped (as appears to be the case today in Russia and
possibly in French civil law countries), then credible signals about the
corporation's intentions (and those of its controlling shareholders)
become critical. The open question is when such a signal will be
credible. Obviously, the more it is made enforceable, the more it
becomes a functional substitute for legal rules. Even naked promises
unaccompanied by corporate actions may sometimes work if the
corporation has previously developed a reputational capital surplus
that it can in effect pledge. In these respects, both corporate
practice and the task of corporate valuation may be more complex
and challenging in transitional countries than in the common law
world, where law and norms today largely coincide.
More generally, to the extent that trust is viewed as the social
cement that holds the organization together, 5' or that behavioral
forces independent of the market and legal sanctions are seen as
shaping cooperation within the firm, then the private benefits of
control are likely to be determined by the strength of the normative
consensus within the broader society within which the corporation
functions. Trust is a learned behavior, not an innate one; thus, what
the corporate participants learn in the broader environment
necessarily carries over to their behavior within the firm.
This centrality of norms has potentially destabilizing implications
for much contemporary corporate law scholarship. An entire genre of
corporate scholarship has focused on the interjurisdictional
competition in the market for corporate charters as allegedly the
principal force that has sharpened and maintained the efficiency of
57 See Black, supra note 11, at 2148 ("In developed countries, firm-level variation in
corporate governance practices has a minor effect on market value.").58 This concept of pledging a firm's reputational capital has long been used to
explain why reputations are particularly important among financial intermediaries,
and especially undenriters. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 619 (1984) ("[T]he seller's
investment in reputation demonstrates that it is not in his interest to misrepresent the
accuracy of its information; and the buyer can rely upon that signal in lieu of engaging
in costly verification itself.").
59 This is the essential thesis advanced by Blair & Stout, supra note 45.
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the American business corporation." Yet, if corporate behavior is as
much or more driven by norms as legal rules, the importance of free
competition in a market for legal rules would seem diminished or at
least more open to question. Put differently, would law-abiding
Scandinavian business managers really behave differently if their
business were incorporated in Switzerland, Austria, or Italy? Arguably,
the legal rules to which they were subject might change, but the
normative frame of reference of the firm's managers would not.
Alternatively, would more predatory businessmen from a French civil
law jurisdiction exploit the latitude that Delaware corporate law gives
them in the expectation that Delaware-chartered corporations will be
governed according to U.S. corporate governance standards? To raise
these questions is not to answer them. Rather, the point here is that
while competition in the market for charters may allow the firm's
founders to choose its formal governance structure, this choice
among available sets of legal rules may be less important than
corporate law scholars have assumed if managers operate within very
variable normative boundaries determined by social forces and
reputational sanctions.
The more one emphasizes the role of norms, or the more the
empirical evidence demonstrates their impact, the less the
corporation looks exclusively like a purely private contractual
mechanism or a simple "nexus of contracts."
.. For the ftillest defense of the desirability of an open market for corporate
charters, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
For representative alternative views, see Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
hIndfrninacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEXAS L.
REVN. 469 (1987). This debate is not limited to the United States, but applies to Europe
as well. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law
Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1991).
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